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Abstract: This paper explores Tolkien’s vision of fantasy within the broader historical context of

Romanticism, clarifying the ways in which he inherits and revises Romantic views of the creative
imagination via the concept of “sub-creation”. Possible links with Coleridge’s thought are considered,
especially with respect to the uses of Romanticism in the context of Christianity.
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Romantic thought
Introduction
In the continuing debate over the genre of Tolkien’s writings,
the appreciation of his life and work as a whole, and his
relationship to the other Inklings, the term “Romanticism”
has enjoyed some currency. In characterizing Tolkien in this
way, recourse has often been made to the now well-trodden
essay “On Fairy-Stories”. The invocation of such concepts as
sub-creation, secondary belief, and eucatastrophe have
inevitably led to comparisons of Tolkien’s views on artistic
creation with the traditional conventions of Romantic
thought: in particular, with those of Samuel Taylor
Coleridge. But while a handful of commentators have
explored these connections in some depth, as yet no one (to
my knowledge) has advanced a clear or convincing analysis
of Tolkien’s place within the Romantic tradition. No one, for
example, has addressed ii a straightforward manner the
question of whether Tolkien has made any significant
contribution to Romantic thought, or if his views are merely
idiosyncratic. Many have carefully taken note of Tolkien’s
apparent disagreements with Coleridge, but few (it seems)
have given much thought to what those discrepancies might
mean as part of a larger picture.
My purpose here is to explore the use of Romanticism as a
way of characterizing Tolkien’s self-understanding in the
context of Romanticism. Specifically, I want to examine
more closely his relationship to Coleridge’s views in order to
clarify what makes Tolkien’s understanding of fantasy
distinctive within the tradition of Romantic thought. Central
to my evaluation is the conclusion that sub-creation (surely
Tolkien’s most celebrated expression) is not, in fact, the most
crucial facet of his theory of the fairy story. Instead, what
emerges as the most distinctive feature of his aesthetic is the
restriction'of sub-creation to the narrative mode, and the
exclusion of the visual as a vehicle of authentic fantasy. My

argument, simply put, is that Tolkien’s seemingly minor
disputes with Coleridge in reality form the necessary basis
for his claim that drama - and indeed all visual modes of art
- are essentially hostile to fantasy (Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 4748).
The absoluteness of Tolkien’s position demands
explanation —not only in its own right but because, unlike
the concept of sub-creation itself (which enjoys a central
place in Romantic thought), its restriction to narrative stands
out as an anomaly1. I offer that Tolkien is being neither
facetious nor idiosyncratic in his rejection of these artistic
modes. Accordingly, the logic of this rejection is to be
deduced from the differing concerns which narrative and the
visual signify for him. To summarize briefly my argument,
Tolkien revises the Romantic tradition by asserting the
validity of fantasy as a distinct mode of art. He differentiates
fantasy from other art forms by restricting it to narrative,
thereby highlighting its non-visual or non-representational
character. For Tolkien, non-visual art implies:
1) a particular relationship between the artist and the
hearer, which demands an active use of the imagination from
the latter,
2) an ambivalence within the human desire to realize
fantasy in the primary world, hindered by the Fall but
anticipating the evangelium, and
3) the ongoing role of humanity as sub-creator, embodied
in the continual recovery of authentic vision through fantasy.
Ultimately, this will lead us beyond the Romantic tradition
to Tolkien’s deeply-held religious convictions. In the last
analysis, it is the contours of Tolkien’s theology which
account for the shape of his Romanticism. None of this
should be surprising to anyone acquainted with Tolkien’s
writings, but for the most part this understanding has been
applied only to the more obvious aspects of “On Fairy-

1 Since its beginnings in the eighteenth-century, Romanticism has freely included both the dramatic and the visual within its aesthetic
canon. For examples of this, see Engell, 1981.
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Stories”; and since these suggest continuity with the tenets of
Romantic thought, they tend to neglect this crucial revision.

Tolkien,
Coleridge,
Tradition

and

the

Romantic

Attempts to identify possible Romantic links to Tolkien’s
thought have focused either upon the essay or upon his
relationships with the other Inklings; in particular, with
Owen Barfield. This latter possibility has most recently been
advocated by Gareth Knight, whose introduction to the
writings of the Inklings posits Barfield as a common
denominator connecting the work of Tolkien, Lewis and
Williams to a more or less explicit Coleridgian hermeneutic:
It is in the psychological and philosophical thought
of Coleridge, on the subject of the imagination, that the
secret of the power of the creative work of the other
Inklings is to be found . . . This was less a conscious
following after Coleridge than a deliberate choice to
cultivate the “mythopoeic” in their writing . . . Their
common purpose had its roots in a unity of spiritual
intention or compatibility . . . Barfield, through his
intellectual influence, both orally and as expressed in
Poetic Diction provided an intellectual stimulus to much
of this.
(Knight, 1990, pp. 10, 11, 13-14)
In his analysis of the nature and extent of the Inklings’
association, Humphrey Carpenter has made reference to
Poetic Diction as expressive of Barfield’s views on language,
and confirms that Tolkien had indeed read and approved of
the book (Carpenter, 1979, p. 42). Carpenter is quick to
remind us, however, of the major differences in Tolkien and
Barfield’s religious outlooks and how those differences do
have a significant impact on their respective understandings
of myth (Carpenter, 1979, pp. 153-157). The mere fact of
Barfield’s discipleship to Coleridge may, therefore, not be
sufficient warrant for Knight’s view of Barfield as the
principal mediator of the Romantic tradition to Tolkien. As
an heuristic convenience, Coleridge’s thought may be a
useful lens for highlighting and accounting for some of the
commonalities of the Inklings as a group; but his views can
neither explain - nor explain away - the differences in the
self-understandings of Tolkien, Lewis, Williams, and
Barfield. Nor does the invocation of Coleridge alone provide
an adequate framework for assessing the relative significance
of those differences.2
There are no explicit references to Coleridge by name in
“On Fairy-Stories”.3 Commentators on the essay have
pointed out at least two passages where they believe Tolkien
to have been consciously engaging Coleridge’s views:
1) Tolkien’s objection to the phrase “willing suspension of
disbelief’4 as an accurate description of the subjectivity
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induced by an effective narrative (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 36), and
2) Tolkien’s redefinition of “fantasy” in relation to what
he calls the technical use of the term “imagination” (Tolkien,
1989a, pp. 44ff). What follows is a brief survey of the
remarks and observations which have been made on these
possible connections to Coleridge’s thought.
Considering Tolkien’s substitution of his own expression
“secondary belief’ (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 37) for Coleridge’s
willing suspension of disbelief, Randel Helms (1974, pp. 11,
77-78), Frank Bergmann (1977, p. 13), and Henry Parks
(1981, p. 142) argue that Tolkien is here strengthening
Coleridge’s words by giving them an affirmative rather than
a negative sense, or by shifting attention from the passive
acceptance of the reader to the active role of the author. Ann
Swinfen concurs with this view (Swinfen, 1984, p. 7), but
suggests that it points to a much deeper philosophical gap
between the two writers:
Coleridge evolved his theory of imagination in reaction
to the associationist theories of Locke and Hartley, but
despite his reading of neo-Platonists like Cudworth or
such earlier writers as Plotinus and Proclus, he never
fully subscribed to the Platonic view that the primary
world is a world of shadows cast by ideal realities.
Tolkien can be seen as essentially a Christian NeoPlatonist . . . while Tolkien probably took the term
“secondary” from Coleridge, Tolkien’s sub-creative art
which creates secondary worlds is also capable of
affording glimpses of joy and eternal truth. Coleridge
did not feel that imagination could grasp truths which
were beyond the scope of reason, although he believed
that religious faith might do so.
(Swinfen, 1984, pp. 8-9)
A dissenting voice to the view that more than mere
terminology is at stake is that of Jan Wojcik, who downplays
the significance of this semantic distinction in order to affirm
that Tolkien and Coleridge are in basic agreement as to “the
functioning of the imagination in art, the nature of the artistic
product, and the motives behind creation” (Wojcik, 1968, p.
134).
Regardless of how one views this matter, it is important to
note that (subsidiary to his main thesis) Wojcik commits a
significant error in his reading of Tolkien. In his framing of
the issue of secondary belief and the willing suspension of
disbelief, Wojcik claims that Tolkien “labors over words
rather than meaning” (Wojcik, 1968, p. 137); for, he reasons,
if these two expressions were to be taken literally, it would
imply that Tolkien was arguing “as if there were an
ontological difference in the kind of art inducing each state”
(Wojcik, 1968, p. 136). Wojcik is absolutely correct in his
reasoning on this point; what seems to escape him is the fact
that this is exactly what Tolkien is arguing.

2 This difficulty is compounded by Knight’s own conflicting motivations for invoking Coleridge. On the one hand, he wants simply to
highlight the similarities of the Inklings from a particular angle; on the other hand, he sees their differences as divisive to his attempt to
“rescue” them from the appropriation of their writings in the cause of religious “orthodoxy”. Knight’s usage of Coleridge’s ideas thus serves
as a normative (rather than a merely heuristic) counter-framework of interpretation.
3 By contrast, Tolkien does make explicit reference to George MacDonald and to G.K. Chesterton. For a useful analysis of the similarities
between Tolkien’s and MacDonald’s views of faiiy story, see Bergmann’s 1977 article.
4 Used by Coleridge in Chapter XIV of the Biographia Literaria, 1907.
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My own view is that Tolkien’s decision to take issue with
Coleridge’s expression is both conscious and intentional.
Tolkien, it must be remembered, is speaking not of artistic
creation in general but of a particular mode of art as distinct
from others. Hence, Tolkien is not seeking to replace
Coleridge’s critical vocabulary as generally applicable to
certain kinds of aesthetic experience; rather, he is asserting
that there is a radical difference between the fairy story mode
and all others. For so complete a distinction as Tolkien is
attempting, a precise and substantive difference in
terminology is called for.
Both secondary belief and the willing suspension of
disbelief concern the reception of art; this, however, is
ancillary to Tolkien’s and Coleridge’s differences regarding
the nature and purpose of artistic creation itself. It is here
that the true extent of Tolkien’s revision of Romantic thought
becomes apparent. In the essay, Tolkien identifies the fairy
story mode with the term “fantasy” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45).
This he does in reaction to what he characterizes as a
misapplication of the meaning - “in technical not normal
language” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 44) - of the term
“imagination”. Tolkien is here striking for the very heart of
the Romantic tradition - that is to say, the role and status of
the creative imagination. But while the terms “fancy” which Tolkien views as “a reduced and depreciatory form of
the older word Fantasy” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45) - and
“imagination” play a central role in Coleridge’s aesthetic
thought, he did not invent them; nor is Tolkien, for that
matter, justified in asserting their distinction to be one of
“technical use” only:
Coleridge’s famous distinction between “fancy” and
“imagination” used to be thought either to have
originated with him or to have had an obscure German
source. But actually a growing distinction between the
terms took place in English usage throughout the
eighteenth century, and in much the same direction in
which Coleridge developed or ramified it.
(Engell, 1981, p. 172)
Before reviewing the commentators on Tolkien’s usage of
these two terms, therefore, some background is needed to
appreciate fully the weight of associations bound up with this
pair. The term “imagination”
had not, by 1700, become connotative in a broad sense.
It meant a fairly limited power connected, in the main,
with the simple formation of images . . . By the 1720s
and 1730s the imagination begins to acquire a distinctly
positive character. It becomes the power not only to
invent images but also to animate and excite, providing
what Dryden called the “life-touches” and “secret
graces” of art . . . i t acquired a moral, aesthetic, and
even religious value that was almost exclusively
positive . . . As' the idea evolved . . . it became a
vital principle for an expanding network of concepts
and values. The understanding of genius, poetic power,
and originality, of sympathy, individuality, knowledge,
and even of ethics grew and took lifeblood from the
idea of the imagination.
(Engell, 1981, pp. 34,41,47)
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This, in brief, is the background within which Tolkien is
working in “On Fairy-Stories.”
But it is also necessary to explain why the uses of fancy
and imagination underwent the transformations that they did:
we must ask why these more or less synonymous ideas
became distinguished in the first place, why people came to
insist on maintaining the distinction and, finally, why
Tolkien found it necessary to revise it. James Engell, in his
historical survey of Romanticism, remarks that Thomas
Hobbes was apparently the last major writer to speak of
fantasy or fancy in the non-depreciative sense:
As this distinction developed, it involved a reversal
of the traditional distinction between the two terms.
Coming from the Greek, phantasia carried with it the
suggestion of creativity and play of mind, with the
possible implication of license and illusion as a by
product of that freedom. The Latin imaginatio, on the
contrary, had a block-like, Roman solidity derived from
the primary word “image,” which referred to a mental
concept as much as a visual “image”. It was akin to the
word “imitation” and carried with it a sense of fidelity
and accuracy. But precisely because phantasia
suggested a greater freedom of mind, whether for
creative insight, for perception, or for illusion, the word
“fancy” began to bear the brunt of suspicion or distrust
thrown by seventeenth century rationalism and, above
all, by the fashionable colloquial speech that echoed it
. . . In the search for a new or different word to
express what . . . rationalism seemed to leave out, the
more solid word “imagination,” with its implication of
being firmly rooted in the concrete, was at hand.
(Engell, 1981, p. 173)
The usage of phantasia and imaginatio, then, begins to shift
as these ideas become caught up in other distinctions and
concerns.
Tolkien’s first move in “On Fairy-Stories” is to restrict the
meaning of imagination to its pre-Romantic sense as the
mental faculty of forming images of objects no longer
present to the senses (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 44). In this he
agrees with Hobbes’ view of imagination as “decaying
sense” (Engell, 1981, p. 14). It is also notable that many
Romantic definitions of fancy agree with Tolkien’s
characterisation of the image-making faculty. What Tolkien
has done, then, is to return imagination from its enlarged
meaning and to recover its literal sense. “In the new
hierarchy of terms,” observes Wojcik,
Imagination would occupy its previous position in the
Thomistic system which describes it as the image
making function, and a new word, Fantasy (a word that
Thomas held to be synonymous with imagination),
would be the term which described [what Coleridge
called]
the “secondary” or “intellectualized”
imagination.
(Wojcik, 1968, p. 135)
But why was it necessary to invent a categorical distinction
where no such distinction had previously existed?
Tolkien’s quarrel over the kind of “belief’ induced by subcreation already hints at a solution to this problem. What
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seems to be at stake is the truth value of art in its various
forms, particularly those forms which do not merely seek to
“reproduce” or “imitate” empirical reality. This concern, in
turn, addresses the question of the value and validity of art,
which for Romantic thought comes to be signified by the
image of the artistic process as analogous to God’s creative
activity. While this vision of humanity as “sub-creative” has
many precedents in both Classical and Renaissance thought
(Engell, 1981, pp. 44, 50), it is only with the Romanticism of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that it becomes
wholly identified with the term “imagination” (Engell, 1981,
p. 138). The inevitable semantic consequence of this
amplification of meaning, as Tolkien himself observed
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 44), is that “imagination” must now stand
for more than one thing; that is, both its literal meaning as
the image-making faculty and its broader designation for the
creative process as a whole. In assessing Tolkien's remarks
on this point, then, it will be helpful to consider whether his
views about fantasy are best characterized as being Romantic
or Classical.
Tolkien’s attempt at recovering a Classical (or Thomistic)
sense of imagination is clear enough; but his treatment of
fantasy is rather more nuanced and does not fit neatly into
either category. Robert Reilly characterizes Tolkien as
“elaborating” and “slightly qualifying” the Romantic view
(1971, pp. 203-204). With respect to Coleridge, he sees
Tolkien to be “defending,” “reviving,” and “making explicit
and Christian Coleridge’s claim for the worth of the creative
imagination” (Reilly, 1971, pp. 205, 210). Swinfen, on the
other hand, once more emphasizing philosophical differences
as the root of their semantic manoeuvring, sees Tolkien “to
all intents and purposes” as consciously reversing
Coleridge’s position (Swinfen, 1984, p. 8). Wojcik, viewing
Tolkien’s apparent disagreements as red herrings, asserts that
he is fundamentally in agreement with Coleridge (Wojcik,
1968, p. 134).
One reason for the wide divergence in judgement over this
point is certainly the differing interests and concerns each
commentator is addressing; yet just as central to their
disagreement is a shared failure to identify the different
concerns which Tolkien himself is addressing in his
definition of fantasy as a distinct artistic mode. This failure
to clarify his remarks leads Reilly to make a confusing and
partially erroneous statement which Wojcik fails to correct in
his own critique of Reilly’s argument. In his book Romantic
Religion, Reilly states that Coleridge “thought of the two
capacities [that is, fancy and imagination] as wholly distinct
faculties”. “Tolkien,” he then goes on to claim, “would re
combine them because he believes ‘the verbal distinction
philologically inappropriate, and the analysis inaccurate’”
(Reilly, 1971, p. 204). Wojcik, accepting Reilly’s
characterisation of Tolkien’s position, suggests that
“Coleridge would combine them also; and Tolkien is closer
to Coleridge in his thinking than either he or Reilly think”
(Wojcik, 1968, p. 135).
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Wojcik and Reilly’s confusion derives from their
conflation of two connected statements made by Tolkien
which seem to be identical, but are in fact distinct in
meaning. I quote these here in full:
[ 1] For my present purpose I require a word which
shall embrace both the Sub-creative Art in itself and a
quality of strangeness and wonder in the Expression,
derived from the Image: a quality essential to fairystory.
[2] I propose, therefore, to arrogate to myself the
powers of Humpty-Dumpty, and to use Fantasy for this
purpose: in a sense, that is, which combines with its
older and higher use as an equivalent of Imagination the
derived notions of “unreality” (that is, of unlikeness to
the Primary World), of freedom from the domination of
observed “fact”, in short of the fantastic.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45, my emphasis)
If Tolkien does indeed speak of fantasy as “combining,” he
also speaks of it as “embracing”. Beyond the obvious
difference in the meaning of these two words, it must be
noted that Tolkien is here using their nuance to clarify two
separate aspects of his definition of fantasy. When he uses
the expression “combining,” Tolkien is referring to the
senses of meaning which he intends the word itself to evoke
(as over against its conventional, depreciative sense). By
contrast, when Tolkien speaks of fantasy as “embracing” he
refers not to the semantic associations of the word, but rather
to its referent, which is for him both the artistic process itself
and the finished product.
What needs to be emphasized here is that Reilly is
incorrect when he claims that Tolkien is combining the
Coleridgian faculties of fancy and imagination. On the
contrary, Tolkien insists that the two be categorically
separated, “imagination” being restricted to its descriptive
meaning as image-making, and “fantasy” elevated to replace
the Romantic faculty of the creative imagination. In
preserving this categorical distinction between fantasy and
imagination, then, Tolkien is best characterized as Romantic
rather than Classical. But Swinfen, too, is not wholly
accurate in her claim that Tolkien simply “reverses” the
terms of the distinction, for as we have already shown,
Tolkien is not defining fantasy as a general mental faculty
but as a distinct mode of art. In this, perhaps, he is unique to
the Romantic tradition.
This cohabitation of both Romantic and Classical elements
in Tolkien’s definition is also perceptible in the double sense
which he attaches to the word “fantasy”. In Tolkien’s own
words, he wishes the term to resonate with both “its older
and higher use as an equivalent of Imagination” - that is, the
Thomistic sense described by Wojcik - and “the derived
notions of ‘unreality’ . . . of freedom from the domination
of observed fact . . . of the fantastic” (in other words, its
“depreciative” Romantic sense)5. “But while admitting that,”
he continues, “I do not assent to the depreciative tone. That
the images are of things not in the primary world (if that

5 I take the Romantic-Classical model from Alex Lewis, whose article on the interplay of these elements in Tolkien’s own fiction concurs
that Tolkien cannot be fit into either category (narrowly understood). See especially Lewis, 1988, p. 11.
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indeed is possible) is a virtue not a vice. Fantasy (in this
sense) is, I think, not a lower but a higher form of Art,
indeed the most nearly pure form, and so (when achieved)
the most potent” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45). With these words it
becomes clear that Tolkien is not (as Reilly would
characterize him) only “slightly qualifying” Romantic
conventions; he is in fact overhauling the entire framework
of Romantic sensibilities by privileging fantasy as the very
paradigm of all art. The keynote of Tolkien’s revisionist
view pivots on his refusal to assent to the depreciative usage
of “fantasy,” the origins of which we now turn to in more
detail.
Behind the diminution of phantasia into fancy “lies the
eighteenth-century tradition of empirical psychology”
(Engell, 1981, p. 130). John Locke’s famous distinction
between simple and complex ideas generated reflection on
the active and passive dimensions of human perception,
ascribing to the mind both “productive” and “reproductive”
powers (Engell, 1981, pp. 18, 20). It is into this cluster of
related distinctions that the heretofore synonymous terms
“fancy” and “imagination” were cast.
As with the Classical sense of imaginatio, the mind was
capable of reproducing sense impressions as they were
received from the empirical world. In addition to this, the
mind could also actively alter, rearrange, and connect these
impressions in a conscious, purposeful and productive way.
The eighteenth-century expression for this latter power was
“association,” and the framework of associationist
psychology was soon adopted into the critical vocabulary of
Romantic aesthetics as a principle of artistic creation.
But not without modifications. From the preceding
psychological distinction between the “reproduction” of
images and their “productive” association, we might expect
phantasia to designate the latter faculty as a positive
foundation for the artistic process; but in fact what takes
place is a further Romantic fracturing of the associative
principle into a greater and a lesser degree, “almost every
discussion of the imagination during the last third of the
century,” writes Engell:
contains either a direct or an implied distinction
between “fancy” and “imagination”. Although there is
no clear-cut correspondence in all these distinctions, at
least one generalization can be made. Most of them
assume fancy . . . to be mainly an associative power
that supplies the mind or the inner eye with numerous
images . . . But the imagination fuses, combines,
transforms, and orders images so that they produce an
artistic or aesthetic unity.
(Engell, 1981, p. 176)
A three-fold understanding of perception as it pertains to
art thus develops in Romantic thought. This may be
summarized as a distinction between memory (the simple
reproduction of sense-impressions, coextensive with human
consciousness), fancy (the associative faculty of productively
combining and rearranging sense-impressions), and
imagination (the power of transforming these associations
into art). There were several reasons for introducing this
tripartite distinction, and a consideration of why fancy was
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systematically excluded from the fold of genuine art will aid
us in understanding Tolkien’s motives for altering its
conventional meaning.
Tolkien himself speaks of fancy as the “enchanter’s
power” and views the association of ideas in terms of the
“the powers of generalisation and abstraction”:
The human mind . . . sees not only green-grass,
discriminating it from other things (and finding it fair to
look upon), but sees that it is green as well as being
grass. But how powerful, how stimulating to the very
faculty that produced it, was the invention of the
adjective: no spell or incantation in Faerie is more
potent. And that is not surprising: such incantations
might indeed be said to be only another view of
adjectives, a part of speech in a mythical grammar. The
mind that thought of light, heavy, grey, yellow, still,
swift, also conceived of magic that would make heavy
things light and able to fly, turn grey lead into yellow
gold, and the still rock into swift water. If it could do
the one, it could do the other; it inevitably did both.
When we can take green from grass, blue from heaven,
and red from blood, we have already an enchanter’s
power —upon one plane; and the desire to wield that
power in the world external to our minds awakes. It
does not follow that we shall use that power well up on
any plane . . . But in such “fantasy”, as it is called,
new form is made; Faerie begins; Man becomes a sub
creator.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 24-25)
But Tolkien, too, sees association as a lesser or subsidiary
power, and so distinguishes it with his definition of
imagination:
The mental power of image-making is one thing, or
aspect; and it should appropriately be called
Imagination. The perception of the image, the grasp of
its implications, and the control, which are necessary to
a successful expression, may vary in vividness and
strength: but this is a difference of degree in
Imagination, not a difference in kind. The achievement
of the expression, which gives (or seems to give) “the
inner consistency of reality” (That is: which commands
or induces Secondary Belief.), is indeed another thing,
or aspect, needing another name: Art, the operative link
between Imagination and the final result, Sub-creation.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 44-45)
Again, it must be recalled that while the sense of Tolkien’s
term “fantasy” combines both the Classical definition of
imaginatio with the associative, Romantic definition of fancy,
what it embraces are not the faculties of phantasia and
imaginatio, but rather two moments in the aesthetic act. This
is perhaps best exemplified in “Leaf by Niggle”, where
Tolkien’s artist, looking upon his realized art, calls it a gift:
“He was referring to his art, and also to the result', but he was
using the word quite literally” (Tolkien, 1989b, p. 88, my
emphasis). For Tolkien, then, “the result” includes both the
artefact itself and the act of beholding it.
Why Tolkien makes this distinction between the sense and
referent of the word will be explored later; what is important
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to note at present is that Tolkien is in fundamental agreement
with the Romantic tradition as to the general character of
association and its subsidiary status within the artistic
process as a whole. Disagreement emerges only over the
issue of where “fantasy” belongs within this framework. The
tradition simply equates it with association, and so restricts
it; Tolkien acknowledges its associative dimension, but then
asserts that this is “a virtue not a vice". More specifically,
there are two aspects of Tolkien’s definition of fantasy which
Romantic thought denies to associative fancy. These arc 1)
its inability to achieve aesthetic unity (“the inner consistency
of reality”), and 2) its lack of connection to reality (its truth
value).
These two aspects are in fact quite closely related. By
definition it would be impossible for something without any
relationship to reality whatsoever to be possessed of the
“inner consistency” of the latter. Moreover, the lack of any
reality-referent can also signify a lack of purpose, which in
turn could make the goal of aesthetic unity unrealisable.
Tolkien, of course, argues against such a view of fantasy.
“Fantasy,” he says, “is a rational not an irrational activity”
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45). If it is indeed “rational” - that is,
motivated and controlled by the faculty of reason - then it
must involve (for Tolkien) both conscious will and purpose.
At some level, it must also engage reason, as expressed by
the question: “Is it true?” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 36).
Because one of the effects of successful fantasy is its
inducement of a kind of subjectivity distinct from that
produced by our perception of empirical reality - that is, of
an affirming “secondary belief’ - Tolkien must defend his
assertion of the rationality of fantasy on two levels. The first
of these concerns us with Tolkien’s disagreement with the
Romantic tradition over the relation between fantasy and the
associative faculty; the second moves us finally to Tolkien’s
novel claim that narrative alone is the only proper mode of
the fantastic. These two levels cannot be understood
independently, for they rely upon one another for their
coherence — if Tolkien had accepted the associative
definition of fantasy, his subsequent restriction of fantasy to
narrative would have been quite unnecessary. Before moving
on to our evaluation of the significance of narrative for
Tolkien, then, we must dwell for a little longer on Tolkien’s
response to the “depreciation” of fantasy by Romantic
thought.
One of the limitations ascribed to fancy as association is
that it is “mechanistic,” and thus incapable of aesthetic unity.
“This association can be spontaneous or willed, ordered or
random, yet it is ‘mechanical’ because the images associated
are not transformed; they appear in the bits and pieces in
which they were first experienced” (Engell, 1981, p. 179).
One of the limitations to such fancy is its apparent
arbitrariness - the parading of its artifice of dissonant images
which appear to lack any natural relationship to each other.
Tolkien recognises this problem, but sees it as distinct from
the issue of secondary belief:
Fantasy has . . . an essential drawback: it is
difficult to achieve. Fantasy may be, as I think, not less
but more sub-creative; but at any rate it is found in
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practice that “the inner consistency of reality” is more
difficult to produce, the more unlike are the images and
the rearrangements of primary material to the actual
arrangements of the Primary World. It is easier to
produce this kind of “reality” with more “sober"
material. Fantasy thus, too often, remains undeveloped;
it is and has been used frivolously, or only halfseriously, or merely for decoration: it remains merely
“fanciful”. Anyone inheriting the fantastic device of
human language can say the green sun. Many can then
imagine or picture it. But that is not enough - though it
may already be a more potent thing than many a
“thumbnail sketch” or “transcript of life” that receives
literary praise.
To make a Secondary World inside which the green
sun will be credible, commanding Secondary Belief,
will probably require labour and thought, and will
certainly demand a special skill.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 46)
But here again Tolkien is simply arguing over whether the
term “fantasy” ought to designate both association and the
achievement of aesthetic unity.
Where he really comes into conflict with Romantic
sensibilities is when he debunks the notion that the primary
world is the only criterion from which to judge the aesthetic
value of patently imaginative creations. For many Romantic
thinkers, fantastic associations are merely fanciful because
their existence is impossible in the primary world (Engell,
1981, p. 120). For Tolkien, by contrast:
Fairy-stories were plainly not primarily concerned
with possibility, but with desirability. If they awakened
desire, satisfying it while often whetting it unbearably,
they succeeded . . . Fantasy is made out of the
Primary World, but a good craftsman loves his
material, and has a knowledge and feeling for clay,
stone and wood which only the art of making can give.
By the forging of Gram, cold iron was revealed; by the
making of Pegasus horses were ennobled; in the Trees
of the Sun and Moon root and stock, flower and fruit
are manifested in glory.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 39, 54-55).
Tolkien’s vocabulary of “revealing,” “ennobling,” and
“manifesting” clearly evokes the Romantic sense that human
imagination is ultimately creative as God is creative. For
Tolkien, then, purely fantastic creations (like the Pegasus) do
constitute an aesthetic unity because the human desire from
which they arise is natural rather than contrived. Their truth
value rests not in their fidelity to the primary world but in
their capacity to signify desire. This argument, however,
simply transfers the question of validity from the signifier to
the signified, and so Tolkien’s defence of fantasy must
ultimately be a defence of the legitimacy of human desire. It
is this which leads Tolkien from the Romantic philosophy of
art to his own convictions about humanity as a Catholic
Christian. In this, his theory of fantasy undergoes significant
departures from Romantic thought; and it is to these
departures which we now turn.
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Drama and Narrative
For Tolkien, fantasy is a thing “best left to words, to true
literature”:
It is a misfortune that Drama, an art fundamentally
distinct from Literature, should so commonly be
considered together with it, or as a branch of it. Among
these misfortunes we may reckon the depreciation of
Fantasy. For in part at least this depreciation is due to
the natural desire of critics to cry up the forms of
literature or “imagination” that they themselves,
innately or by training, prefer. And criticism in a
country that has produced so great a Drama, and
possesses the works of William Shakespeare, tends to
be far too dramatic. But Drama is naturally hostile to
Fantasy. Fantasy, even of the simplest kind, hardly ever
succeeds in Drama, when that is presented as it should
be, visibly and audibly acted.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 46-47)
To some, Tolkien’s judgement may appear unnecessarily
polemical, particularly when one recalls the intensely
“dramatic” character of much of his own creative writing6,
and perhaps it is for this reason that less attention has been
paid to this aspect of “On Fairy-Stories”. But Tolkien’s
emphasis on the “hostility” of drama to fantasy, as I have
been insisting and will now demonstrate, is an integral
element to what makes him distinctive in the context of
Romanticism.
Tolkien has basically two qualms about drama’s attempting
to be a medium of fantasy: 1) it necessarily relies on visual
representation, and 2) it is necessarily anthropocentric in
both its form and content. Beginning with the first problem, I
will show that Tolkien’s two revisions of the Romantic
tradition already discussed - that is, his preference for the
expression “secondary belief’ over Coleridge’s willing
suspension of disbelief, and his refusal to restrict the
meaning of “fantasy” to its depreciatory sense as a
mechanical, associative faculty - are identical in spirit and
motive to his polemic against drama. Interestingly, we will
find that Tolkien’s criticism of the limitations of drama in
many ways resonates with the conventional Romantic view
of “fancy” as a lesser form of imagination.
A principal defect in dramatic attempts at achieving the
fantastic, in Tolkien’s view, is that: “the producers of drama
have to, or try to, work with mechanism to represent either
Fantasy or Magic” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 47). If fantasy is
difficult to achieve through words, how much more difficult
is it to effect before the naked eye? These are good grounds
for disqualifying drama in Tolkien’s view since, for him,
fantasy must be capable of producing secondary belief.
Because drama is rarely able to conceal its own artifice it
can, like Romantic fancy, hope to achieve little more than a
willing suspension of disbelief.
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If Tolkien’s criticism were directed merely against this
technical ineptitude of mechanism for producing visual
fantasy, we might hold some doubts as to its continuing
validity: for today, over half a century after the essay was
written, we do possess a cinematic art (certainly both visual
and dramatic) with the power of giving the inner consistency
of reality to fantastic images with great facility. But
Tolkien’s reasoning is, in fact, much more comprehensive:
A reason, more important, I think, than the
inadequacy of stage-effects, is this: Drama has, of its
very nature, already attempted a kind of bogus, or shall
I say at least substitute, magic: the visible and audible
presentation o f imaginary men in a story. That is in itself
an attempt to counterfeit the magician’s wand. To
introduce, even with mechanical success, into this
quasi-magical secondary world a further fantasy or
magic is to demand, as it were, an inner or tertiary
world. It is a world too much. To make such a thing
may not be impossible. I have never seen it done with
success. But at least it cannot be claimed as the proper
mode of drama . . . For this precise reason —that the
characters, and even the scenes, are in Drama not
imagined but actually beheld —Drama is . . . an art
fundamentally different from narrative art.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 48)
With drama the eye of the beholder must inevitably be
focused upon the human condition - it is human beings who
make up the primary content of dramatic performance.
“Very little about trees as trees can be got into a play”
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 48). Moreover, Tolkien’s claim that
drama’s difference from narrative lies in the fact of its being
beheld rather than imagined is surely linked to literature’s
capacity to circumvent the dramatic focus on the humane.
In other words, it seems that we have here stumbled upon
the beginnings of an understanding of the motive behind
Tolkien’s definition of fantasy as narrative art embracing
both the act of artistic creation itself and the experience of
the finished product. The principal content of fantasy or the
fairy story (that is to say, the absence of a limited dramatic
focus on the human condition as such) is somehow related in
Tolkien’s mind to the form in which the finished product is
experienced (that is, through the exercise of the imaginative
faculty rather then being “beheld” by the human eye). These
two aspects of Tolkien’s aesthetic (the non-anthropocentric
and the non-visual) ultimately join forces to lay the
foundation for his vision of fantasy as a narrative of alterity of otherness, of transcendence. Taken together, these three
dimensions of the visual form the mediating link between
Tolkien’s terminological disputes with Coleridge and his
unique theology of the eucatastrophe as the highest function
of fantasy. We examine each of these dimensions in turn.

6 The “drama” of Tolkien’s writing lies as much in the aurality of reading and hearing it as it does in the narrated story itself. In this respect,
John Ellison observes that Tolkien’s sub-creation “is a world of sound as much as it is a world of sense and specific meaning. Sound, that is,
expressed not only through the medium of his languages, real and invented, but also in the wealth of sound images in the text, with all their
consequentially evoked sensations of light and darkness, colour and space. This is the dimension of reality that Tolkien found to be lacking
in spoken drama . . . LotR plays itself out as an immense drama against a scenic panorama which each reader creates and paints in his or
her own mind, and Which ho literal stage representation could even begin to rival” (Ellison, 1988, p. 18).
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1. Imagination and the Visual
We begin by recalling that Tolkien’s criticism of drama as
fantasy extends beyond the incidental ineptitude of
mechanism to the fact of its representing the fantastic
visually:
The radical distinction between all art (including
drama) that offers a visible presentation and true
literature is that it imposes one visible form. Literature
works from mind to mind and is thus more progenitive.
It is at once more universal and more poignantly
particular. If it speaks of bread or wine or stone or tree,
it appeals to the whole of these things, to their ideas;
yet each hearer will give to them a peculiar personal
embodiment in his imagination. Should the story say
“he ate bread”, the dramatic producer or painter can
only show “a piece of bread” according to his taste or
fancy, but the hearer of the story will think of bread in
general and picture it in some form of his own. If a
story says “he climbed a hill and saw a river in the
valley below”, the illustrator may catch, or nearly
catch, his own vision of such a scene; but every hearer
of the words will have his own picture, and it will be
made out of all the hills and rivers and dales he has ever
seen, but specially out of The Hill, The River, The
Valley which were for him the First embodiment of the
word.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 70)
In the above-quoted passage we get a glimpse of Tolkien
the Neo-Platonist (cf. Swinfen’s remark, 1984, p. 9); but we
also discover another important facet of his idea of
secondary belief. We affirm here with the commentators that
Tolkien seeks a stronger, more positive expression than
Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief;” but pace
Parks’ view (cf. Parks, 1981) that Tolkien’s intention is to
strengthen the voice of the narrator, what he is in fact doing
is expanding the role of the hearer. Just as in his art the artist
actively participates in God’s primary creative activity, so
too in his or her hearing of the artist’s narrative the hearer
actively participates in the act of imagination induced
(indeed, necessitated) by its non-visual character. In
Tolkien’s own words, such narrative makes it possible for
artist and hearer to become “partners in making and delight”
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 50)7.
This understanding aids us in further clarifying Tolkien’s
definition of fantasy as an artistic mode. Rather them
speaking of a unity in the process of creation with the
finished, sub-creative product, we might more accurately
speak of a collaboration between the work of the author and
the work of the reader/hearer; for the implication of
Tolkien’s remarks about narrative force us to view the
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artistic product as unfinished until the hearer has actively
“completed” it by way of imaginative effort. This, I believe,
is the logic behind Tolkien’s claim that fantasy must
“embrace both the Sub-creative Art in itself and a quality of
strangeness and wonder in the Expression, derived from the
Image” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45).
All forms of art, to use Tolkien’s vocabulary, involve the
possession and use of the imaginative faculty, the artistic
process itself, and the artistic product; within this schema,
the fantastic narrative is distinguished by the particular
character of the relationship between the author and hearer
(or, alternately, between the two moments of artistic creation
and reception). This can be illustrated by the following
diagram;
“ART”
(the work of the artist)

“THE EXPRESSION”
(the imaginative work of the hearer)

“THE IMAGE”
(the imaginative faculty common to both artist and hearer)
The visual, then, is hostile to Tolkien’s aesthetic because it
destroys this special relationship between author and hearer
which is necessary for the operation of fantasy8.

2. Identity and Difference
Tolkien’s second reason for the exclusion of drama as
fantasy - its necessarily limited focus on the human
condition —concerns not so much the means or operation of
fantasy as its ultimate purpose or goal which, as we have
already suggested, looks toward that which is other and
transcendent to human experience. In this sense it is the
limitations of the human condition itself which constitute a
kind of visual presence needing to be transcended in order
for fantasy to begin. This is the “quality of strangeness and
wonder in the Expression, derived from the Image” of which
Tolkien speaks - the quality which awakens our desire and
invites us to participate in its operations.
The claim that fantasy is not properly “about” the human
condition raises the thorny question of its value and validity
as a product of human imagination. Despite Tolkien’s
assertion of its virtue (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45), this question
has served as a central rallying point in attacks levelled
against the fantastic from many quarters, notably in the
criticism of Tolkien’s own work on the part of the literary
establishment. If fantasy were “about” nothing other than
itself, totally unconnected with reality, then it would indeed
be legitimate to regard it as little more than an exercise in
depreciative fancy. But as we have already seen, Tolkien

7 In her unpublished thesis, Deirdre Greene (1989) has explored this dimension of Tolkien’s aesthetic from the very fruitful perspective of
reception theory. Her study of Tolkien’s fictional writings provides insightful examples of how this “providential” relationship between the
artist and the reader/hearer outlined at the philosophical level in “On Fairy-Stories” manifests itself in the very texture and event structure of
his narrative at the literary level.
8 One of Coleridge’s motivations in insisting on the fancy-imagination distinction was the need to separate artistic genius from the
unwashed masses, who are at best only capable of mechanical fancy (Biographia Literaria Chapter VI). Tolkien, by contrast, uses this
distinction to unite the activity of the artist with the reader/hearer. The operation of fantasy is, indeed, impossible without the active,
participatory role o f the reader/hearer’s imaginative faculty. It is the imagination which facilitates partnership in making and delight.
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views fantasy as generated by legitimate human desires.
Fantasy remains a valid art form because, for him, those
desires refer to or anticipate something which itself possesses
an “underlying reality” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 64), though a
reality distinct from that which we now experience.
As we have seen, part of the self-referentiality of fantasy’s
being “about” itself stems from the unity of the form and
content necessary to its operation: its non-visual mode of
presentation offers us images of things which are themselves
not to be seen within the world as we know it. It now appears
that this correlation is intentional, and that Tolkien’s
insistence that fantasy embrace the activity of both artist and
hearer is extended to its final goal as well as its operations.
Tolkien expresses this view not only at the philosophical
level, but in the content of his own creative writings. This is
best seen in the role played by the Elves:
At the heart of many . . . stories of the elves lies,
open or concealed, pure or alloyed, the desire for a
living, realized sub-creative art . . .O f this desire the
elves, in their better (but still perilous) part, are largely
made; and it is from them that we may learn what is the
central desire and aspiration of human Fantasy - even if
the elves are, all the more in so far as they are, only a
product of Fantasy itself.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 50)
The central desire of fantasy, then, is that our sub-creations
be granted primary existence - that they become a part of
reality. Tolkien’s Elves signify this desire because (unlike
us) they do possess the power (in the secondary world) of
giving primary reality to their artistic creations. The Elves
are “about” themselves because they are only a product of
our imagination - once again, the forms which our
imagination invents or “discovers” are identical or
organically related to the content of our desires.
It would be accurate to say that, in this sense, Tolkien
holds to an autotelic or self-generating view of fantasy
(hence his claim for its validity), but only in the larger
context of his Romantic belief in humanity as sub-creative made, that is, “in the image and likeness of a Maker”
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 52); for not all human desires are equally
legitimate, and for this reason the Elves signify not only the
identity of our desire, but the peril of difference - that which
we cannot and should not seek to realize in this world.
Tolkien therefore distinguishes genuine artistic desire
(signified by Elvish “enchantment”) from its counterfeit
(which he calls “magic”):
Enchantment produces a Secondary World into
which both designer and spectator can enter, to the
satisfaction of their senses while they are inside; but in
its purity it is artistic in desire and purpose. Magic
produces, or pretends to produce, an alteration in the
Primary World . . . it is not an art but a technique; its
desire is power in this world, domination of things and
wills.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 49-50)
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Tolkien also identifies magic with “the machine” (that is,
technology):
Unlike art which is content to create a secondary
world in the mind, [machinery] attempts to actualize
desire, and so to create power in this World; and that
cannot really be done with any real satisfaction . . .
And in addition to this fundamental disability of a
creature, is added the Fall, which makes our devices not
only fail of their desire but turn to new and horrible
evil.
(Tolkien, 1981, pp. 87-88)
Another aspect of visuality for Tolkien, then, is that it can
suggest an illicit attempt to realize desire in this world - to
display something visually becomes a metaphor of coercion.
It is for this reason that our desires, for Tolkien, must not
only be expressed, but contained by the boundaries which
separate art from the primary world9. Because the primary
world is, for him, a fallen world, our sub-creative desire
cannot help but be fraught with ambivalence and danger.
Hence, the rejection of visuality constitutes one element in
Tolkien’s larger moral resistance to the perils and
temptations of humanity’s fallen nature. But if our desires
are corruptible, so too they are in Tolkien’s mind
redeemable. Indeed, if the central desire of fallen humanity is
the realization of its imaginative creations, then just as
central must be the desire to escape our fallen state itself.
Romantic thought had made art the analogy of divine
creation, but it is Tolkien who brings fantasy into a unique
relationship with salvation history. Whereas tragedy is, for
Tolkien, the highest function of drama, eucatastrophe is the
highest function of fantasy, which he describes as
a sudden and miraculous grace: never to be counted on
to recur. It does not deny the existence of
dyscatastrophe, of sorrow and failure: the possibility of
these is necessary to the joy of deliverance; it denies (in
the face of much evidence, if you will) universal final
defeat and in so far is evangelium, giving a fleeting
glimpse of Joy, Joy beyond the walls of the world,
poignant as grief.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 62)
“The Birth of Christ,” writes Tolkien, “is the eucatastrophe
of Man’s history. The Resurrection is the eucatastrophe of
the story of the Incarnation . . . It is not difficult to
imagine,” he continues,
the peculiar excitement and joy that one would feel, if
any specially beautiful fairy-story were found to be
“primarily” true, its narrative to be history, without
thereby necessarily losing the mythical or allegorical
significance that it had possessed. It is not difficult, for
one is not called upon to try and conceive anything of a
quality unknown. The joy would have exactly the same
quality, if not the same degree, as the joy which the
“turn” in a fairy-story gives . . . It looks forward (or
backward: the direction in this regard is unimportant) to
the Great Eucatastrophe. The Christian joy, the Gloria,

9 In her important structural study of the genre, Rosemary Jackson sees the representation of desire and its containment as two principal
strategies deployed by fantastic literature to achieve its effects (Jackson, 1988, p. 3).
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is of the same kind; but . . . this story is supreme, and
it is true. Art has been verified.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 65-66)
Tolkien’s view of the Incarnation as “verifying” art is the
key thought in the above-quoted passage which links it to the
theme of visuality as realisation. Unlike most Romantic
christologies which tend to focus on Christ as the prototype
of artistic creation alone, Tolkien focuses not on the
mediatory aspect of the person of Christ, but on the fact of
incarnation itself - that desire has in fact been fulfilled in the
primary world and, hence, becomes the prototype not of
creation but of future fulfilment.
Unlike much Romantic thought, which came to ascribe a
saving character to the exercise of the imagination, Tolkien
viewed salvation as strictly the province of the evangelium
itself. In characterising the eucatastrophe of human fantasy
as “looking forward or backward” toward the primary
eucatastrophe, however, he nevertheless grants it a special
status - not only verifying the evangelium and being verified
by it in turn, narrative fantasy also comes to confirm our
continued nature as sub-creators. It looks not only backward
to the Incarnation; it looks forward to the Parousia and final
redemption. In this latter function it becomes not so much
the analogy to salvation, but prophetic in character. This
moves us to the final (and in this case positive) sense which
the visual signifies for Tolkien, which he calls “recovery.”

This rediscovery of difference is crucial to Tolkien’s
defence of fantasy because it gives a rationale for its
independent value apart from the anticipation of the
evangelium. Like the many leaves of a single tree, each new
story “is a unique embodiment of the pattern” (Tolkien,
1989a, p. 52, my emphasis). “No assumptions about the
nature of reality, even purely supematuralist or acausal
beliefs held absolutely, release the storyteller from the task
of making a story” (Parks, p. 147). In this respect, the
unrealisability of human desire as signified by the non-visual
character of fantasy refers as much to a positive aspect of our
nature as it does to the negative consequences of the Fall - if
desire were absolutely satisfied, it would imply that our role
as sub-creators was at an end. But this is surely not the case:
“Redeemed Man,” writes Tolkien, "is still man”:
Story, fantasy, still go on, and should go on . . .S o
great is the bounty with which he has been treated that
he may now, perhaps, fairly dare to guess that in
Fantasy he may actually assist in the effoliation and
multiple enrichment of creation. All tales may come
true; and yet, at the last, redeemed, they may be as like
and as unlike the forms that we give them as Man,
finally redeemed, will be like and unlike the fallen that
we know.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 66)

3. Recovery as the Redemption of the Visual

Two general conclusions may be drawn from this analysis of
Tolkien’s thinking. Firstly, Tolkien’s revisions of Romantic
thought are necessary components to his defence of literary
fantasy as a genre in its own right. Secondly, while
eucatastrophe remains Tolkien’s unique contribution to
Christian Romanticism, it is his insistence upon the non
visual character of fantasy (rather than the idea of subcreation as such) which structurally links Tolkien’s
aesthetics to his theology, and it is an appreciation of this
link which allows us to view Tolkien’s Romanticism as an
integral dimension to his life and work as a whole.

Conclusion
Tolkien describes recovery as the “regaining of a clear
view”:
I do not say “seeing things as they are” and involve
myself with the philosophers, though I might venture to
say “seeing things as we are (or were) meant to see
them” - as things apart from ourselves. We need, in
any case, to clean our windows; so that the things seen
clearly may be freed from the drab blur of triteness or
familiarity —from possessiveness.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 53)
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